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CHAPTER SIX
MACINTYRE AND KOVESI ON THE NATURE OF MORAL CONCEPTS
R. E. Ewin and Alan Tapper
1. Kovesi, MacIntyre and Ways of Doing Philosophy
Julius Kovesi was a moral philosopher contemporary with Alasdair 
MacIntyre, and dealing with many of the same questions as MacIntyre. 
In our view, Kovesi’s moral philosophy is rich in ideas and worth revisiting. 
MacIntyre agrees: Kovesi’s Moral Notions, he has said, is ‘a minor classic in 
moral philosophy that has not yet received its due’.1 Kovesi was not a 
thinker whose work fĳits readily into any one tradition. Unlike the later 
MacIntyre, he was not a Thomistic Aristotelian, nor even an Aristotelian. 
He saw his viewpoint as Platonic, or perhaps more accurately as Socratic.2 
His writings, unlike MacIntyre’s, have little to say about justice.3 However, 
Kovesi did offfer a theory of practical reason. His main contention was that 
all human social life embodies a set of concepts that govern and guide that 
life, concepts without which that life would be impossible. These include 
our moral concepts. For Kovesi, moral concepts are not external to, but 
constitutive of social life in any of its possible forms. But in the course of 
his argument he also developed a way of thinking about how concepts 
work, which we term ‘conceptual functionalism’, and which we will 
elucidate.
Moral Notions is a short book, and, while it is about moral concepts, one 
might fairly say that there is in it not much extended discussion of any 
particular moral concepts. Those of us who think it an important book 
have the task of showing how its tersely-made arguments can be expanded 
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and applied. This is what we will attempt to do in this paper, drawing upon 
some well-known work by MacIntyre, and showing what we think is 
Kovesian in spirit in MacIntyre’s work, because he never explicitly adopted 
Kovesi’s approach or employed Kovesian notions such as that of a formal 
element. The idea of a formal element is Kovesi’s central idea, and we will 
explain it further later in this essay.4 We will take an example of a moral or 
partly moral concept, the concept of lying, which both Kovesi and 
MacIntyre have discussed.5 Naturally, we are not pretending to give a com-
plete analysis of this concept. Our point is to show in what direction we 
think further discussion needs to go.
Philosophy can be done in a number of diffferent ways, taking a number 
of diffferent forms, and MacIntyre does not always follow the same proce-
dure in his work. One thing that philosophy can do is to clarify a dispute, 
even if it does not settle the dispute. This is a task that MacIntyre takes on 
at times, as in his lecture on patriotism:
One of the central tasks of the moral philosopher is to articulate the convic-
tions of the society in which he or she lives so that these convictions may 
become available for rational scrutiny. This task is all the more urgent when 
a variety of conflicting and incompatible beliefs are held within one and the 
same community […] [T]he fĳirst task of the moral philosopher is to render 
explicit what is at issue in the various disagreements.6
But, even then, MacIntyre is concerned to put the relevant concept (in this 
case, patriotism) in the context of other concepts:
To say this is to draw attention to the fact that patriotism is one of a class of 
loyalty-exhibiting virtues (that is, if it is a virtue at all), other members of 
which are marital fĳidelity, the love of one’s own family and kin, friendship, 
and loyalty to such institutions as schools and cricket or baseball clubs.7
This approach is very similar to the method advocated by Kovesi, looking 
for groups of concepts and for what makes the concepts a group. 
MacIntyre does not always follow this procedure, and it plays little part in 
0001550950.INDD   124 6/16/2012   9:16:47 AM
 macintyre and kovesi 125
8 MacIntyre, Ethics and Politics, pp. 139–40.
9 MacIntyre, Ethics and Politics, p. 137.
his discussion of patriotism, but he often does consider concepts that go 
together and seeks the point of their being grouped together. So we do see 
similarities between his work and Kovesi’s, similarities we shall try to draw 
out while showing how Kovesi’s approach in terms of concepts and formal 
elements takes the discussion further, in ways that will emerge.
2. MacIntyre’s Account of Lying and Truthful Relationships
In his discussion of lying and truth-telling MacIntyre’s method is to start 
not from moral concepts but from moral theories, those of Kant and Mill. 
Towards the end of the discussion, he offfers an account of the ethics of 
lying that, he says, contains elements of Kantian morality while also agree-
ing with elements of J. S. Mill’s views on the subject.8
Truthfulness is good and lying is wrong, MacIntyre says, for three kinds 
of reasons: lack of commitment to truthfulness can corrupt and destroy 
the integrity of rational social relationships; truthfulness is necessary 
because it makes trust possible, especially in the giving and receiving of 
criticism of existing social practices; and truthfulness is a virtue that helps 
us to hold in check the power of phantasy, which ‘can be and often is used 
to disguise and to distort our activities and our relationships and has the 
efffect of deforming them’. His view is summed up in the idea that ‘in any 
relationship in which the goods of rational persons are to be achieved, the 
truthfulness of those participating in that relationship will be of crucial 
importance’.9
MacIntyre’s discussion of Mill and Kant is not, by and large, germane to 
our discussion here; what concerns us is his building up of his own account 
of the wrongness of lying when it is wrong. In this account he introduces 
two cases that, he thinks, illustrate the way in which ‘universal and general 
principles’ that we normally accept have on occasions to be rejected. The 
fĳirst is that of a Dutch housewife during the Nazi occupation who, when 
her Jewish neighbour was about to be taken away to a death camp, took 
the neighbour’s child into her own home and promised to take parental 
responsibility for the child. When asked by a Nazi offfĳicial whether all the 
children in the household were her own, she lied by saying that they were. 
MacIntyre’s second example is of a Massachusetts single mother who 
faced obviously serious threats, made by a violent former lover, to the life 
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of her small child. She responded by shooting the man and killing him.10 
Given that in neither case could the life of the child be saved without the 
woman’s taking the action that she did, MacIntyre says, either woman 
would have failed in her duty with respect to the child had she acted dif-
ferently. People who agree with him in these judgements, he says, can 
escape charges of ‘moral superstition’ in doubting the principles prohibit-
ing lying and killing if they can produce a well-founded principle that can 
provide justifĳication for the particular judgements.
The formulation of such principles has to begin from a very diffferent starting 
point from that from which Kant set out. Instead of fĳirst asking ‘By what 
principles am I, as a rational person, bound?’ we have fĳirst to ask ‘By what 
principles are we, as actually or potentially rational persons, bound in our 
relationships?’ We begin, that is, from within the social relationships in 
which we fĳind ourselves, the institutionalized relationships of established 
social practices, through which we discover, and through which alone we 
can achieve, the goods internal to those practices, the goods that give point 
and purpose to those relationships.11
There are points to notice here for comparison with Kovesi. One is that 
MacIntyre seeks principles, by which, it emerges later, and as is suggested 
by the two examples above, he seems to mean rules. The relationship 
between rules, principles, and concepts is a main theme of Moral Notions.12 
Another is that, like Kovesi, MacIntyre places the issue fĳirmly into a social 
context. And the third is that, even in the social context, he seems to 
emphasise the notion of rationality. A little later, he goes on to say:
From this moral point of view that I have been sketching the evil of lying 
then consists in its capacity for corrupting and destroying the integrity of 
rational relationships.13
For MacIntyre, this provides the point of being concerned about the evil of 
lying (when it is evil) and also explains why the exceptions, such as the 
Dutch housewife, must be treated as an exceptional case in which lying is 
required. And it cannot really be an exception to any satisfactory rule; the 
point generating the rule must generate a rule that accommodates such 
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cases as that of the Dutch housewife. MacIntyre’s suggestion here is deal-
ing with a point close to what Kovesi refers to as the formal element of a 
concept, but it is not quite the same as what Kovesi means by that term. As 
we will explain, Kovesi thought that lying should be seen as an ‘incom-
plete’ moral concept, so for him the formal element of the concept of lying 
cannot be elucidated in terms of the evil of lying. MacIntyre sums up his 
conclusion by describing the relevant rule this way:
It would be misleading to state it as though its form was ‘Never tell a lie 
except when …’ For this would suggest that we were fĳirst formulating a rule 
and only later, as a second thought, introducing an exception. But this is a 
mistake. The rule that we need is one designed to protect truthfulness in 
relationships, and the justifĳied lies told to frustrate aggressors serve one and 
the same purpose and are justifĳied in one and the same way as that part 
of  the rule that enjoins truthfulness in relationships. […] The rule is 
therefore better stated as ‘Uphold truthfulness in all your actions by being 
unqualifĳiedly truthful in all your relationships and by lying to aggressors 
only in order to protect those truthful relationships against aggressors, 
and even then only when lying is the least harm that can affford an efffective 
defense against aggression.’ This rule is one to be followed, whatever the 
consequences, and it is a rule for all rational persons, as persons in 
relationships.14
Lying is not wrong when it is necessary to protect truthful relationships 
against aggressors. In those circumstances, lying is a duty if the relation-
ship being protected is one that I have a duty to protect, such as a mother 
to her child, or a guardian to her ward. This account, MacIntyre thinks, is 
not at all ad hoc. It is such that it ‘both generally and indeed almost always 
prohibits lying and yet requires it on certain normally rare types of 
occasions’.15
3. Kovesi on the Concept of Lying
Kovesi’s account agrees with MacIntyre in contending that lying is not 
always wrong. It is not wrong in the case when the falsehood is used to 
0001550950.INDD   127 6/16/2012   9:16:47 AM
128 r. e. ewin and alan tapper
16 Kovesi, Moral Notions, 1967, p. 110; 2004, p. 80.
17 This ‘test’ is discussed further below. Kovesi held that we understand concepts in 
terms of ‘what would count as the same’ and ‘what we would do instead’ in diverse 
contexts.
18 Kovesi, Moral Notions, 1967, pp. 106–07, see also pp. 103–11; 2004, p. 78, see also 
pp. 75–80.
prevent an injustice, as when it is ‘saying what is not the case in order to 
save the life of an innocent from a maniac’.16 The life saved is not that of a 
wrongdoer being sheltered from police; it is the life of an innocent being 
sheltered from a wrongdoer. Sheltering a wrongdoer may indeed be a way 
of saving a life, but saving a life is not the point of Kovesi’s example. The 
point is the prevention of injustice, and the saving is saving a life threat-
ened by injustice. The lie in that case is serving the ends of justice, and that 
is what makes it not wrong—not even slightly wrong. The liar may regret 
having to lie, but he should not regret lying, since the act itself is not in 
any degree wrong.
Moral Notions is an account of concept formation and how concepts 
serve our moral and rational purposes. To illustrate how concept forma-
tion might work in the problematic sort of case posed by the need to 
shelter an innocent person, Kovesi invents a concept which he calls 
‘savingdeceit’.
Problems like this are sometimes represented in terms of ‘conflict of princi-
ples’; we have the principle ‘lying is wrong’ and also ‘lives ought to be saved.’ 
Let us suppose now however that we had a single term by the help of which 
we can state that a life is being saved by means of a deceit. Other instances 
of this act could be to dress the intended victim as an old woman or to put a 
wardrobe in front of the door where he is hiding. We might call these 
instances of ‘savingdeceit,’ and instances of savingdeceit are not instances of 
lying. We could apply our test of asking what one would do instead of an act 
of savingdeceit.17 One might try to ring the police or bolt the doors or frighten 
the maniac with a gun. If we have not got a gun to make the maniac go away 
we might think of another tool that can achieve the same end, we could use 
language. One way of making the maniac go away is by means of savingde-
ceit. In some cases the material elements of the notion of lying and that of 
savingdeceit may coincide but they amount to diffferent acts.18
To see his point we need to see how he thought concepts work. There is no 
clash between lying and savingdeceit except at the level of what he called 
the ‘material elements’ of the concepts. The material elements of a good 
act, savingdeceit, may sometimes coincide with the material elements of 
what is normally a bad act, lying. But the appearance of conflict is 
resolved if we think about the point or ‘formal element’ of these concepts. 
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The concept of savingdeceit has the point of avoiding or preventing injus-
tice. The concept of lying has the point of identifying mistruths that might, 
with further specifĳication, amount to injustice. In that sense it is an 
‘incomplete’ moral concept.19
Here we need to explore further Kovesi’s account of concepts and 
meaning. He distinguished between ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ moral 
concepts, giving murder and cheating as examples of the fĳirst, and lying as 
an example of the second:
when x is a moral term, the judgment ‘x is always (or sometimes) good’ tells 
us about the logical and conceptual features of the term x; it tells us whether 
the term specifĳies an act from the moral point of view and to what extent it 
does this. When the term is a complete term, complete from the moral point 
of view, then ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ function like reminders, they signify that our 
term has been formed from the moral point of view. When our term is 
incomplete, or open to further specifĳications from the moral point of view, 
then we use ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to discriminate and distinguish from the 
moral point of view between diffferent instances of the act referred to by the 
incomplete term.20
Consider what Kovesi says about the open texture of concepts.21 Consider 
the concept of murder. There are many ways in which one can murder 
somebody: one can shoot him with a gun; one can shoot him with a bow 
and arrow; one can shoot him with a crossbow; one can stab him with a 
knife; one can stab him with a pitchfork; one can stab him with a screw-
driver; one can stab him with an icicle; one can hold his head under water 
for fĳifteen minutes (or an infĳinite list of other possible times); one can 
starve him; one can garrotte him with clothesline; one can garrotte him 
with fĳishing line; one can poison him with arsenic; one can poison him 
with cyanide; one can poison him with a great many, possibly unlimited, 
other substances; some perhaps not yet discovered; and so on. The list 
ends with ‘and so on’, and so it must end. People are relatively fragile crea-
tures, but ingenious; somebody who comes up with a new way of killing 
somebody (consider charges of grievous bodily harm laid against people 
for attempting to infect others with HIV) will not be able successfully to 
plead not guilty to a murder charge on the ground that his method is not 
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on the list. What the formal element of a concept gives us, on Kovesi’s 
account, is a way of arguing out each particular case and of deciding what 
is relevant and what is not; it gives a way of sorting out what sort of facts 
(material elements) are relevant to showing an action to be unjust, cruel, 
etc. The point of MacIntyre’s rule does much the same if we set aside the 
rule he uses to formulate it, which is why his approach here is similar to 
Kovesi’s but his approach is not the same because he stays with rules 
rather than dealing with concepts.22
4. MacIntyre’s Rules and Kovesi’s Concepts
Kovesi, then, deals with what might appear to be quite disparate cases, but 
cases that amount to the same thing. They are all, for example, despite hav-
ing diffferent material elements, cases of injustice. The problem of how 
cases with diffferent properties can be brought into one grouping arises 
just as much with MacIntyre’s rule as it does in the case of murder: to show 
that his rule applied to cases with difffering features, he would, in efffect, 
have to fĳind the formal element that brought them together. This is espe-
cially the case if we consider his background point: more is required for 
social relationships than simply telling the truth. Even in the area of 
whether one tells the truth, questions arise about how the rule will apply. 
Should one have told the truth? Should one have remained silent? If, at the 
presentation of Nobel Prizes, I am for some reason on stage, and whisper 
(quite falsely) to a proud recipient as he moves forward to accept his award 
that his flies are undone, does the rule cover that? It embarrasses the 
recipient and does no other harm, and I gain no unfair advantage. Suppose 
that, rather than whispering the lie, I am offf-stage at the presentation and 
do not whisper to the recipient when he is about to go on stage that his 
flies are undone when, in fact, they are, does that come under the same 
rule? In either case, the reasons might be various: perhaps I just have a 
warped sense of humour; perhaps I want to see the Nobel Prizes ridiculed; 
perhaps I wanted to win that particular Nobel Prize and am being spiteful; 
or there might be many others. If a country’s chief fĳinancial offfĳicer in a 
closed economy plans to devalue the currency, but when asked if he has 
such plans lies by saying that he has not, does that come under the rule? 
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He is not, as was the Dutch housewife, protecting anybody from physical 
aggression, though he is stopping a charge at the currency market. And so 
on. Rules are not the correct focus of attention in such matters. As Hobbes 
pointed out, all rules stand in need of interpretation; we need to think in 
terms of the appropriate light in which to interpret them, to fĳind what is 
relevant and what is a reason.23 This is the task undertaken in seeking the 
formal element of the concept involved, be it murder, lying, or whatever.
MacIntyre writes of the point of a rule, in terms of which the rule is to 
be interpreted, but this efffectively makes the statement of the point the 
over-riding rule: do whatever promotes truthful relationships, with telling 
the truth or lying being simply a number of cases in which that aim can be 
pursued or not pursued. Compare Kovesi’s approach:
The sense in which a complete moral notion provides us with a principle is 
the sense in which it enables us to say that the following two are examples 
of the same act: saying what is not the case in order to bring punishment on 
someone for an act for which he is not responsible, and saying what is not 
the case in order to gain a benefĳit to which I am not entitled; but on the other 
hand saying what is not the case in order to save the life of an innocent from 
a maniac is not an example of the same act.24
Here the ‘principle’ at work involves ideas of entitlement and responsibil-
ity—that is, presumably, rights and duties.
On Kovesi’s account, the lower level concept is a more specifĳic case of 
the more general concept: not all injustices are murders, but all unjust kill-
ings are murders.25 And the more general concept is not merely instru-
mental. It might be very important that we have the concept of justice 
(and a sense of justice) because, without them, we could not have a social 
life and no individual person would be able to pursue his or her own inter-
ests at all efffectively. But even if that is, in Kovesi’s terms, the formal ele-
ment of the concept of justice, the concept of justice is not the concept of 
what promotes or makes possible social life; the formal element does not 
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fĳilter down through the concept of justice in that way. Lying, killing offf 
nasty people, and a host of other injustices might grease the wheels of 
social intercourse, but the conditions we have for living together, the rules 
of justice, prohibit injustices.
Consider another example that might help to clarify the point about a 
concept and its formal element. People have to be able to get on together 
much of the time, and one reason the concept of kindness is important in 
our lives is that kindness helps people to get on together both by helping 
the person who needs help at the time and by promoting goodwill from 
that person, not necessarily to, or only to, the person who was kind. But if 
it is seen that one is acting simply to promote good will from the other and 
not out of any sympathetic concern for the other’s plight, one’s actions will 
fail to get the response that genuine kindness gets. The concept of kind-
ness is not the concept of acting so as to promote good will, and the con-
cept does not cash out into our having reasons to do with promoting good 
will when we do act kindly. But the account of why kindness is important 
to human life is an account of why the reasons on which a kind person acts 
are reasons for people, by showing how particular material elements, the 
reasons on which the kind person acts, are brought together under the 
formal element of the concept of kindness. Consideration of the formal 
element gives an account of the practical reasons.26
Kovesi’s theory of meaning, then, emphasises that concepts are to be 
understood in terms of their points, or, in his terminology, their formal 
elements. The point or formal element of a concept is the reason it is 
important in our lives that we have the concept, and that explains why the 
reasons coming under the concept are reasons. The reason or reasons play 
a role in our socially-shared lives. This role will vary as circumstances vary. 
In one context concept X will apply in such-and-such a way; in another 
context it will apply in a very diffferent way. One example he used was of 
somebody seeking to buy flowers but unable to fĳind any. If he makes do by 
buying chocolates, he was looking for a gift; if, instead, he buys ribbons, he 
was looking for a decoration. The applications are what Kovesi called the 
material elements of the concept. His key point was that a concept will 
have one and the same point or formal element in all of its applications. 
What counts as a table or a murder or a gift may well vary dramatically 
from case to case, while remaining a table or a murder or a gift in each 
case. To see the sameness across diverse cases requires us to think in terms 
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of the point of the concept. If we fail to do that, we see only the diverse 
material elements and thus will too easily conclude that there is no gen-
eral concept.
5. Other Points Showing that Lying is Not a Complete Moral Concept
Lying is commonly used to cover up wrongs already done and to facilitate 
the doing of future wrongs. In these sorts of cases lying is plainly wrong. Its 
formal element is injustice, and it is morally speaking in the same category 
as the wrongs with which it is associated, such as murder, etc, though it is, 
as non-fatal, usually less serious. Clearly, perjury and slander are sub-
categories of this kind of lying. Lying difffers from common injustices in 
that it involves falsehood, but the falsehood only makes the lying possible; 
it doesn’t add to the wrongness.
There is more to the morality of lying than simply the matter of justice 
and injustice. The potential for lying enters into all aspects of social life 
and thus into all aspects of morality. For example, lying as an act of kind-
ness can’t be covered by considerations of justice and injustice. In the case 
of ‘kind lies’ we have already got a counterpart of Kovesi’s ‘savingdeceit’ in 
the concept of a ‘white lie’. The example illustrates Kovesi’s idea of the 
formal element of concepts. The notion of a white lie looks like a contra-
diction in terms: wrong if we see it as lying; not wrong if we see it as ‘white’. 
But the wrongness is illusory. No injustice is done by a white lie; no unfair 
advantage is taken. The act is, ex hypothesi, an act of kindness, and kind-
ness is not wrong; it is, in fact, a species of goodness.
Blufffĳing shares a number of properties with lying and could be regarded 
as a sub-species of lying, but blufffĳing in a game of poker is not wrong, 
again because no unfair advantage is taken. That is simply what is expected 
in poker; it is part of the game. It has been suggested from time to time 
that advertising should be regarded in the same way, so that falsehood or 
misleading statements in advertisements should not be regarded as dis-
honest on the ground that no sensible person takes them seriously. With a 
lot of advertising, though, and especially advertising directed at children, 
that is too much like involving a neophyte in a game of poker with profes-
sionals, and that is taking an unfair advantage. It is perhaps comparable 
with the snooker player who performs badly amongst people to whom he 
is unknown, but then, when the amount of money wagered increases 
enough, turns on a performance beyond the capacity of any of them and 
beyond anything they could reasonably have expected of him. And, one 
more sort of case, I might lie harmlessly to somebody (about, say, whether 
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from having good intentions. We cannot intend to do what is good without intending to 
consider all the relevant facts, but we can have good intentions and be quite irresponsible’, 
Moral Notions, 1967, pp. 132–33; 2004, p. 95.
his flower garden looks better than that of his neighbour) simply because 
I know he is in a bad mood and I don’t want him to vent his spleen on me. 
This is a lie told for my own advantage, not to save him any trouble, but 
avoids some social disruption and might well be considered to be akin to 
a white lie.
The apparent contradiction involved in the idea of a white lie is not real, 
but only if the kindness really is kindness, and that presupposes a recipient 
whose feelings really are vulnerable. Telling a white lie to a person quite 
capable of hearing the truth is not succeeding in performing an act of kind-
ness. Telling a white lie to a colleague or an authority in the normal course 
of business—for example, commenting too kindly on their work perfor-
mance—is to let them down and weaken your relationship. It is therefore 
not a white lie. Failing to tell a lie when a lie is necessary to prevent a wrong, 
out of concern for the feelings of the would-be perpetrator, is to be doubly 
incompetent from a moral point of view. The kindness is misdirected, and 
is thus not kind; and the consequence is to aid a wrong, which, morally 
speaking even if not legally speaking, is itself a kind of wrongdoing.27
Telling a lie in order to sell a product or a service is neither a white lie 
nor a case of savingdeceit. Often such lies are harmless, but they can 
deceive and thereby harm the gullible and, as is clear in the case of adver-
tising, seek unfair advantage over competitors by misleading customers. 
Sometimes the lies are plainly fraudulent, in which case they are injustice. 
In both types—harmless and fraudulent—the wrongness is plain enough. 
That such lies are so common in advertising arises from the fact that the 
consumer can punish the lie-teller only by not buying the product being 
spruiked, but sometimes the product is worth having even despite its 
deceptive presentation, so the deception often goes unchecked, but this 
wrongness, minor though it is, remains wrongness. The wrongness is not 
minor when the consumer’s health or safety is at risk, and in those cases 
even small lies can be serious wrongs.
Falsely boosting one’s wares is similar to falsely boasting about one’s 
abilities. The idle boaster does no wrong if he is seen for what he is. But he 
can’t be trusted with anything important. And if his boasting is sufffĳiciently 
skilful he will do wrong, because he will succeed in engaging our trust 
undeservedly.
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To sum up, there are three general points here. Firstly, Kovesi’s idea of 
savingdeceit is not particularly novel. It is formed from the same pattern 
we applied in forming the concept of a white lie. The diffference is that 
savingdeceit is governed by justice as its formal element, whereas the 
white lie is governed by kindness.
Secondly, Kovesi is right that lying is an incomplete moral concept, and 
right too in pointing to the role of complete moral concepts in our moral 
life. Again, we already have such concepts in the area marked out, incom-
pletely, by the concept of lying. These are terms such as bearing false wit-
ness, perjury, libel, slander, and fraudulence. It is these terms that pick up 
the ways in which some forms of lying are always wrong, or wrong in 
themselves. Unlike the concept of lying, these concepts are complete 
moral concepts. Given the roles of these complete moral concepts, we 
should have no need to construe lying as a complete moral concept. 
MacIntyre, in his desire to fĳind a rule which will generate conclusions 
about both those lies that are morally right and those that are morally 
wrong, seems committed to the idea that there is only one sort of lie that 
is wrong, that all the examples can be brought under one concept.
Thirdly, the morality of lying is complex, but its complexities simply 
mirror the complexities of social life. There is nothing surprising in this 
complexity and no special rightness in truth-telling or any special wrong-
ness in speaking falsely. Kovesi’s ‘conceptual functionalism’ has one advan-
tage over MacIntyre’s approach to the problem: it takes the focus offf what 
MacIntyre calls truth-telling. Cooperative social life involves cooperative 
talking and telling, and this is what ultimately governs the morality of 
lying. One can speak falsely while playing a cooperative role, as when act-
ing in a play, or as when deceiving a wrongdoer. Or one can tell the truth 
non-cooperatively, as in seeking to hurt the feelings of a vulnerable per-
son, or as in telling the wrongdoer where to fĳind his intended victim, or as 
in randomly reading sentences out of a reliable encyclopaedia. Truth-
telling is only distantly related to truthfulness and honesty. It is normally 
good, as it plays a large part in normal social cooperation. But, apart from 
when it is playing that part, it is simply neutral. This is the third key point 
in Kovesi’s account of lying. False-speaking is at most a material element 
of lying; it in no way explains the wrongness of lying. Likewise, truth-
telling is good only in so far as it plays a role in cooperation, and even then 
it is only a material element of the relevant morality, which itself requires 
distinctive moral concepts, such as honesty and veracity, to mark it out. 
From a Kovesian standpoint, one can see that false-speaking and truth-
telling are not even moral concepts. These descriptions are morally neu-
tral. Moral issues do not arise at the level of speaking falsely.
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28 See ‘Moral Relativism, Truth, and Justifĳication’, in his The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected 
Essays, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 52–73. See also his 
This is to explain morality in a top-down way, and it presumes we can 
give some content to ‘morally wrong’, so there is the danger of begging the 
question. But if so, approaching the question by the bottom-up method 
(as MacIntyre partly does) clearly won’t do either—it presupposes that we 
can demarcate the moral merely by whittling away at the material ele-
ments. To do this we have to have a sense of what we are aiming at—that 
is, we need what Kovesi called the moral point of view.
6. Conclusion
Taken overall, MacIntyre’s account of lying is closely similar to Kovesi’s 
discussion of lying in Moral Notions. There are dissimilarities also, and 
some of these are minor. Yet the overall similarity is far from obvious, 
because their methods of argument are very diffferent. Kovesi’s method of 
argument is to start from the general question of what concepts do, and 
then of what moral concepts do. We have called this method ‘conceptual 
functionalism’.
Kovesi held that moral concepts are not external to, but constitutive of 
social life. They explain why certain sorts of facts are reasons in certain 
sorts of circumstances, and those reasons construct rational life and ratio-
nal relationships. MacIntyre contends very similarly that morality is 
focused on the protection of rational social relationships. However, 
MacIntyre’s moral philosophy—unlike Kovesi’s—looks in two directions. 
In one direction, it emphasises the diversity of moral outlooks. Moral the-
ory today, he thinks, must deal with apparently irreconcilable diffferences. 
Not only are there such diffferences, but they extend to the question of 
how to describe the diffferences. Thus, there is a strong tendency towards 
accepting moral relativism. Deep conflicts in the work of moral philoso-
phers have not diminished but rather strengthened that tendency. In the 
opposite direction, he contends that amongst the various moral traditions, 
there is one and only one tradition that has a strongly plausible strategy 
for dealing with these moral diffferences. That is what he has described 
fĳirstly as the Aristotelian and later as the Thomistic Aristotelian tradition. 
That tradition, he argues, can provide two vital things missing in rival tra-
ditions: a theory of justice, and a theory of truth and justifĳication. Most 
recently, he has drawn upon a Thomistic theory of truth and justifĳication 
to rebut the relativist.28
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Kovesi’s moral thought did not draw upon Thomistic Aristotelian meta-
physics and does not propose any special theory of truth and justifĳication. 
How, then, can he avoid moral relativism? The best answer is in terms of 
his conceptual functionalism. The concept of justice deals with what is 
necessary for social life, and MacIntyre agrees that justice is necessary for 
social life. This in itself sets a limit on relativism. Further, Kovesi’s theory 
of concepts contains a built-in variability that is relevant here. Granted, as 
MacIntyre has shown, that the history of moral thought and practice 
exhibits many diverse accounts of justice, we must still ask the Kovesian 
question of how these diffferent accounts of justice can all be accounts of 
justice. The precise requirements of justice and of other moral concepts 
may vary in part because of difffering social conventions. To avoid behav-
ing offfensively one needs to know the conventions, such as shaking hands 
or whether men conventionally keep their hats on indoors or in the pres-
ence of ladies. And interpretations of the concept of justice may also vary, 
between cultures and between individuals. Whether something is a loan 
or a gift, and hence the justice of failing to return it, depends on conven-
tions that can difffer from one society to another—is there, for example, a 
convention that a traveller must be supported for three days without 
charge? Whether one has committed an unjust killing of somebody who 
breaks into one’s home depends (at least partly) on conventions expressed 
in the laws setting out how one may behave in such circumstances. But it 
is what Kovesi called the formal element of the concept that makes these 
all interpretations of justice.
From Kovesi’s standpoint, the diversity of moral concepts can have only 
limited scope. If he is right, then diverse moral stances are possible only 
because we already have in place a more basic set of concepts. It may be 
that in some cases moral problems are actually insoluble. But what cannot 
be true is that we lack a set of relevant terms in which to debate our 
diffferences. If we lacked those terms we could not even recognise the dif-
ferences as diffferences. More basically, we would not even exist in order to 
have the debates about our diffferences.
‘Intractable Moral Disagreements’ and ‘From Answers to Questions: A Response to the 
Responses’, in Intractable Disputes About the Moral Law: Alasdair MacIntyre and Critics, 
Lawrence S. Cunningham ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2009), pp. 1–52 and 313–51.
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